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2018年09月22日 15:57:38|来源:国际在线|编辑:飞度医院大全
Why are real interest rates so low? And will they stay this low for long? If they do – as it seems they might – the implications will be profound: good for debtors, bad for creditors and, above all, worrying for the vigour of global demand.为何眼下实际利率这么低?这一局面还将延续很久吗?如果确实如此(目前看来有这样的趋势),那么影响将十分深远:债务人受益,债权人受损,并且最重要的是,不利于全球需求的活跃。The International Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook includes a fascinating chapter on global real interest rates. Here are its most significant findings.在国际货币基金组织(IMF)最近公布的《世界经济展望》(World Economic Outlook)报告中,有一章关于全球实际利率的分析令人关注。以下就是那一章的最重大发现。First, globalisation has integrated finance. There used to be wide variation in real interest rates between different countries. That is no longer the case, since interest rates everywhere now respond to common influences.首先,全球化促使金融一体化。以前,不同国家的实际利率存在很大差距。现在已不是这样,因为如今各地的利率都对共同的影响因素做出反应。Second, real interest rates – which are adjusted for inflation – have declined a long way since the 1980s. Ten-year rates are close to zero while short-term rates are negative. But the expected real return on equity (estimated from the dividend yield plus the expected growth of dividends) has not fallen by as much (see charts).其次,自上世纪80年代以来,经通胀调整后的实际利率已下降了很多。10年利率接近于零,短期利率则为负值。但预期实际股本回报率(通过股息率和预期股息增长率估算得出)的下降幅度不如实际利率(见图表)。How is one to understand these developments? The real return on financial assets depends on various factors: how much people want to save and invest; what kind of assets savers prefer to hold; and changes in monetary policy. These are not independent of one another. Above all, central banks charged with hitting an inflation target must respond to shifts in demand by changing their monetary policies.应如何理解这些变化呢?金融资产的实际回报取决于多个不同因素:人们想要储蓄多少、投资多少?储蓄者更愿意持有何种资产?以及货币政策发生了何种变化?这几个因素并非相互孤立。最重要的是,各国央行肩负着达到某一通胀目标的使命,它们必须通过改变货币政策来回应需求变化。The IMF reckons that, in the 1980s and early 1990s, changes in monetary policy were the most powerful influence on real interest rates. In the late 1990s, fiscal tightening became the main force driving down real rates. Another important factor was the falling price of investment goods relative to consumption goods. Falling relative prices of information technology mean this is still true.IMF认为,上世纪80年代到90年代初,货币政策的改变是对实际利率影响最大的因素。上世纪90年代末,财政紧缩成为压低实际利率的主要因素。另一个重要因素,是投资品价格相对消费品价格不断降低。信息技术价格相对下降意味着,眼下情况仍然如此。Since the late 1990s, however, much has changed. In emerging economies the savings rate has gone up, largely because incomes were rising. Investors began to favour assets deemed safe. Most importantly, recent financial crises have caused investment to collapse and private savings to jump in the affected economies.但自从上世纪90年代末以来,情况发生了很大变化。在新兴经济体,储蓄率上升,主要是因为收入在增加。投资者开始青睐所谓安全资产。最重要的是,近来的金融危机导致在受到冲击的经济体中,投资显著减少、私人储蓄大幅增加。The IMF argues that declining inflation risk has not contributed to the fall in long-term rates, since the “term sp” – the gap between short and longer-term rates – has not fallen. More important has been the effect of changes in national savings and investment. At the global level, savings must equal investment. So changes in the observed global savings rate will tell us nothing about whether there has been a growing “savings glut” – by which I mean an excess of desired savings over desired investment. Only a shift in the price – the real rate of interest – reveals that.IMF提出,通胀风险降低没有起到助力长期利率降低的作用,因为“期限利差”——指短期利率与长期利率之间的差值——并未下降。更重要的是国民储蓄与投资变化的影响。在全球范围来看,储蓄必然等于投资。所以,我们观察到的全球储蓄率,根本无法告诉我们“储蓄过剩”是否一直在升高。此处“储蓄过剩”是指超出意愿投资额的那部分意愿储蓄。唯有价格——实际利率——的变化能揭示这一点。Strikingly, the 10-year real rate of interest was 4 per cent in the mid-1990s, 2 per cent in the 2000s, before the crisis, and close to zero thereafter. At least two factors lay behind this precipitous fall. Investment fell a long way in high-income economies but soared in emerging ones, especially China; yet the savings rates of emerging economies rose even more than their investment rates. Consequently, these economies became big net exporters of capital.引人注意的是,上世纪90年代中,10年期实际利率为4%,到本世纪头十年(危机之前)降至2%,再后来降至接近零。10年期实际利率陡然下跌背后至少有两个因素在起作用。高收入经济体投资一路下滑,但新兴经济体——尤其是中国——投资却大举升高;不过,新兴经济体储蓄率增幅甚至比投资率增幅还要高。结果,这些经济体成了资本净出口大国。Emerging countries also largely nationalised this capital outflow. Their governments then tended to buy “safe” assets, especially to put in the foreign exchange reserves. This helps explain the portfolio move towards highly rated bonds.新兴国家也将大部分资本输出国有化了。于是,它们的政府倾向于购买“安全”资产,尤其是作为外汇储备。这有助于解释投资组合为何向高评级债券倾斜。The story, in brief, is that shifts in the balance between desired real savings and investment generated a large fall in real interest rates. These were accompanied by changes in portfolio preferences towards safe assets and the collapse in the pre-2000 equity bubble. The shift in the distribution of income towards capital and highly paid employees in high-income countries also weakened demand. The central banks then responded with aggressive monetary policies. These supported explosions of credit generally linked to house-price surges. Both imploded in the crisis. As Lawrence Summers has argued, the high-income economies seem to be worryingly unable to generate good growth in demand without extreme credit instability.简言之,情况是意愿实际储蓄与意愿实际投资之间的差额发生变化,导致实际利率大幅下降。另外两个因素是,投资组合偏好发生变化、向安全资产倾斜,以及2000年前股票泡沫的破灭。在高收入国家,收入分配向资本方和高薪员工倾斜,也弱化了需求。于是各中央推出了激进的货币政策。这推动了信贷大膨胀,信贷大膨胀通常看来与房价猛涨脱不开干系。信贷和房价在危机中都崩溃了。正如劳伦斯#8226;萨默斯(Lawrence Summers)所指出那样,令人担忧的是,高收入经济体似乎无法在不制造极端信贷动荡的前提下,推动需求强劲增长。This is not a short-term story. The label “secular stagnation” looks apposite. The IMF agrees that real interest rates could remain low for a prolonged time. If governments persist with planned tightening of fiscal policies, this seems certain. If investment rates fell sharply in China, global real rates might need to fall still further. That is difficult while inflation is so low.这种情况并不是短期内的。“长期增长停滞”(secular stagnation)看上去是个贴切的论断。IMF赞同实际利率可能在长期内维持低位的观点。如果各国政府坚持按计划实行紧缩的财政政策,则看来注定会出现这种局面。如果中国投资率大幅下降,那么全球实际利率可能需要进一步下降。在通胀如此低的情况下,这很难办到。What might reverse this? The obvious possibility is a jump in investment in high-income countries driven by the relatively high expected returns on equity. The obstacles here are threefold. One is that chief executives are not rewarded for investing for the long term; another is that investment goods are becoming cheaper all the time; and another is that, when the future is uncertain and the economy sluggish, companies rationally prefer to wait before they invest.靠什么才能扭转这一局面?一个显而易见的可能药方,是相对较高的预期股本收益率驱动高收入国家的投资猛增。这里有三重障碍。一是首席执行官没有动力为长期而投资;另一个是投资品的价格一直在降低;最后一个是,当未来不确定、经济又低迷时,企业出于理性考虑,愿意观望而不愿投资。Another possibility is a big fall in savings in emerging economies. But this seems unlikely, at least without a collapse in oil prices.** That leaves the option of sustained fiscal deficits in high-income countries, ideally to be invested in infrastructure. Housing-related credit booms are a far worse option. Redistribution towards the spenders seems quite inconceivable.第二个可能药方,是新兴经济体储蓄率大幅下降。但这似乎不可能实现,至少油价不暴跌的话就不太可能实现。那就只剩下一个选择,即高收入国家维持财政赤字,最好投资于基础设施。与房地产相联系的信贷繁荣则是一个糟糕得多的选择。通过再分配向花钱者倾斜看上去不可思议。If real interest rates do indeed remain low for a long time, creditors are going to find life difficult. But managing the post-crisis public finances should be far easier than the hysterics assume. A really big question in such a world is whether conventional inflation targets might be too low, because they do not give enough room for real interest rates to fall as far below zero as necessary.如果实际利率确实长期维持在低水平,那么债权人未来会觉得日子不好过。但管理后危机时代的公共财政,应当会比歇斯底里者认为的容易得多。如此世界一个真正的大问题,是常规的通胀目标定得可能太低了,因为没有给实际利率在必要时降至负值留下足够大的空间。The immediate question, however is: how do we generate the demand that is needed to mop up potential global supply? Failure to answer that need in a sensible way was a leading cause of the crisis. Continued failure will blight the recovery or, worse, cause another bout of financial and economic upheaval. Do not imagine these challenges will soon vanish. They look like a semi-permanent condition.不过,当前的紧迫问题是,我们应如何产生撑潜在全球供应所离不开的需求?不能以合理方式满足这一要求是过去引发危机的一个主要因素。这一要求继续得不到满足将阻碍复苏,更严重者,将引发又一轮金融与经济动荡。不要臆想这些挑战不久后就会消失,它们看来就像一种半永久性的病症。 /201405/295035Hong Kong police are investigating a series of deposits allegedly linked to Malaysian prime minister Najib Razak, as a scandal over claims of misappropriation from a state development fund continues to sp.香港警方正在调查一系列据称与马来西亚总理纳吉布拉扎克(Najib Razak)有牵连的存款。纳吉布被指从国家发展基金挪用资金的丑闻正在继续发酵。The probe in the Chinese territory is another blow to Mr Najib. Transactions allegedly linked to the 1Malaysia Development Berhad fund, whose advisory board he chairs, are also the subject of investigation by Swiss prosecutors.香港这个中国特别行政区展开的调查,是对纳吉布的又一个打击。瑞士检察机关也在调查据称与“1MDB”(1Malaysia Development Berhad)基金有关的交易,纳吉布是该基金顾问委员会主席。A Malaysian government spokesman denounced the Hong Kong allegations as “baseless and politically motivated lies”. It said the premier was looking at legal options to stop those with “malicious intent” to ”smear and discredit” him.马来西亚政府的一名发言人谴责香港的指控“毫无根据,是具有政治动机的谎言”。马来西亚政府称,总理正在寻找法律途径,以阻止那些对他“恶意诽谤和抹黑”的人。Mr Najib’s opponents claim he used an array of agencies, companies and banks linked to 1MDB to move more than 5m into his own bank account. He denies the 1MDB link and says he has done nothing wrong, as the funds were from an unnamed Middle Eastern donor and not for his personal gain.纳吉布的对手们称,他利用一连串与1MDB关联的代理机构、公司和,将超过6.75亿美元转移到他本人的账户。他否认与1MDB有财务瓜葛,称自己没有不当行为,账户上的资金来自一位不愿透露姓名的中东捐助者,而且不是用来为他自己谋取私利的。Hong Kong police are investigating bank deposits of more than 0m allegedly made at a Credit Suisse branch in the city. Credit Suisse declined to comment. The probe was sparked by a report to authorities by Khairuddin Abu Hassan, a critic of 1MDB and a member of Mr Najib’s ruling ed Malays National Organisation until he was sacked this year, ostensibly as he was bankrupt.香港警方正在调查据称在瑞信(Credit Suisse)香港分行存入的超过2.5亿美元存款。瑞信拒绝置评。这项调查是由一份提交给官方的报告引发的,报告作者是凯鲁丁阿布哈桑(Khairuddin Abu Hassan),他是1MDB的批评者,并曾经是纳吉布所在的执政党——马来民族统一机构(ed Malays National Organisation,中文简称“巫统”)党员,直至今年被开除,开除的表面原因是他陷入破产。Mr Khairuddin alleges the deposits were made via four companies linked to Mr Najib: Alliance Assets International, Cityfield Enterprises, Bartingale International and Wonder Quest Investment.凯鲁丁称,上述存款是由四家与纳吉布关联的公司存入的,这些公司是:Alliance Assets International、Cityfield Enterprises、Bartingale International 以及 Wonder Quest Investment。“These companies are highly questionable,” he wrote on his Facebook page. “I have asked the police in Hong Kong to make a detailed and comprehensive investigation of the companies’ financial resources and transactions.”“这些公司是很成问题的,”他在自己的Facebook页面上写道。 “我已请求香港警方对这些公司的财务资源和交易展开全面详尽的调查。”Hong Kong police confirmed they had received the request and that investigations were under way. The companies could not be reached for comment.香港警方实收到了请求,并称调查正在进行。记者联系不上上述公司请其置评。Mr Khairuddin said he had lost faith in probes by authorities in Malaysia. “I wanted police from another country to investigate comprehensively and transparently and without any influence from the prime minister of Malaysia,” he wrote. “ I no longer have trust or confidence in the police, the [central bank] and the office of the attorney-general.”凯鲁丁表示,他对马来西亚当局的调查已经失去了信心。 “我希望另一个国家的警方进行全面和透明的调查,不受马来西亚总理的任何影响,”他写道。“我对警察、央行和总检察长办公室不再信任或抱有信心。”Mr Najib’s side accused Mr Khairuddin of lodging ”false and politically motivated police reports”. 纳吉布一方指责凯鲁丁提交“虚假和出于政治动机的报案报告”。 /201509/398464

China Development Bank is the core policy bank in China. It has more than Rmb 6tn (4bn) in assets, is wholly owned by the state and is as good for its money as the government itself. So when CDB is forced to cut the size of a proposed bond issue by 60 per cent, as happened this month, you can be sure something is not right in China’s credit markets. 中国国家开发(China Development Bank)是中国最重要的政策性。它拥有超过6万亿元人民币(9840亿美元)的资产,为全资国有,信用与政府相当。因此,本月当国开行被迫将拟定的债券发行量削减60%时,可以肯定中国的信贷市场出了问题。 Other respected and credible companies have also been forced to delay or reduce bond issues, or pay more for their money. Take US-listed internet group Baidu. Last year, it sold a bond to US investors that was priced without the extra that emerging market borrowers usually pay. But in recent months, it struggled to get a Chinese bond away. 另外一些名誉好、信用高的企业要么被迫推迟发行债券或削减发行量,要么付出更高利息。以在美国上市的互联网公司百度(Baidu)为例。去年它向美国投资者发行债券时,没有付新兴市场借款人通常需要付的溢价。但近几个月,百度在中国发债却遭遇困难。 China’s cost of capital has begun to rise even though the government seems some way from the liberalisation of deposit rates that has held down borrowing costs for so long. Banks must aly pay more for funds in the interbank market. Meanwhile, wealth management products (WMPs) – short-term savings products sold mostly by banks to retail and institutional investors – and trust products continue to grow. Both are currently offering better returns than straight corporate bonds to all investors, including banks themselves. 长期以来,低储蓄利率压低了中国的借款成本。虽然距离政府完全放开储蓄利率尚有时日,但中国的资本成本已经开始上升。已经必须为在拆借市场借款付出更高成本。与此同时,理财产品——主要由向零售和机构投资者销售的短期储蓄产品——和信托产品仍在不断增长。二者目前均能向所有投资者(包括本身)提供比企业债券更高的回报率。 The issue here is less about the rising cost of money – which is inevitable as markets come to play a “decisive” role in China, as the post-Plenum buzzword has it – than it is about bad policy, or at least the consequences of slow policy. 十八届三中全会过后,让市场在中国发挥“决定性”作用成为热门话题,资金成本上升不可避免。问题在更大程度上并不在此,而在于不良政策——或者至少说是决策迟缓的后果。 With financial reform, Beijing may be gracefully “crossing the river by feeling the stones” as advocated by the late Deng Xiaoping, but it is simultaneously turning a blind eye to jerry-rigged fording devices, like WMPs, just down stream. 对于金融改革,中国高层或许可以像已故领袖邓小平推崇的那样,从容不迫地“摸着石头过河”。但与此同时,它对下游那些粗制滥造的“过河”工具(如理财产品)视若无睹。 Plenty of ink has been spilled on the risks tied up in WMPs, but much less on what they are really there to do. Their role is to begin to allow market forces to affect the cost of money for banks and companies ahead of interest rate reform; WMPs also legitimise investments that have not yet been officially approved, or are banned in banking channels. They do this simply by being an intermediary, or wrapper around the banned products. 关于理财产品蕴含的风险已经不乏论述,但它们存在的作用却鲜有人提及。它们的作用是在利率改革之前允许市场力量影响和企业的资金成本,以及将那些尚未被正式批准、或被渠道封杀的投资方式合法化。为此,理财产品扮演着“中介”或被禁产品“外包装”的角色。 Hence, they have been used to supply high-cost capital to property developers, as well as some state-owned enterprises. More recently, they have moved on to investing in hedge funds. Managers and their friends or family put up the first chunk of equity, then WMPs add up to four times that in leverage, say Shanghai hedge fund specialists. This allows insurers, for example, to indirectly invest in funds that officially they should not. 于是,理财产品被用于向房地产开发商和部分国有企业提供高成本资金。最近,它们又涉足对冲基金投资领域。上海的对冲基金专业人士表示,经理及其亲友先筹得第一笔股份,再通过理财产品构筑最高可达4倍的杠杆。举例而言,这可以让保险商间接投资于一些本来不被官方许可的投资。 One of the great oddities in Chinese financial policy is that liberalisation happens as much negatively as positively. Companies like the financial arm of ecommerce group Alibaba have found that the way to develop products is often to start using them and see if someone tells you to stop. It can lend to small businesses but was warned away from early trials of consumer loans. 中国金融政策的一大奇怪之处在于,自由化的发生包括正面和负面两种方式。电商集团阿里巴巴(Alibaba)旗下的金融子公司等企业发现,开发产品的方法往往是先上马,然后坐视是否会被叫停。阿里金融可以向小企业发放贷款,但早期试水消费者贷款被叫停。 Financial innovation is rarely given preapproval, bankers say. The industry is forced to “feel the stones” in the absence of clear policy. Surely Deng’s metaphor was about discovering what works, not what would gain official sanction. 家表示,金融创新很少能得到事先批准。在没有明确政策指引的情况下,行业被迫“摸着石头过河”。毫无疑问,邓小平这则比喻的要义是寻找行之有效的道路,而不是官方会点头的东西。 Viewed optimistically, WMPs have introduced a market for funding, lending and investing that ought to help banks and others learn to assess risks and to balance changeable costs and returns. However, their role in legitimising not yet sanctioned, or aly banned, activities just adds to the inefficiency and costs in the distribution of Chinese capital. 乐观地看,理财产品提供了一个融资、贷款和投资的市场,应当能帮助等机构学会评估风险,在风云变幻的成本和回报之间进行权衡。然而,理财产品在合法化那些尚未被批准、或已被禁止的金融活动方面的作用,只会徒增中国资本分配中的低效和成本。 The power of each new yuan to generate economic growth is waning. The leakage of costs through extra layers of WMPs makes this worse. China’s cost of capital will rise, but it does not have to rise that much. Interest costs track gross domestic product growth rates, according to Bernstein Research. If China grows at 6-7 per cent for the next few years, new debt ought not to cost much more – so long as it is dispensed reasonably efficiently. 每一元人民币促进经济增长的能力正在萎缩。理财产品附加结构带来的成本溢出,令情况雪上加霜。中国的资本成本将上升,但没有理由上涨那么多。伯恩斯坦研究公司(Bernstein Research)表示,利息成本应当追随国内生产总值(GDP)增长率。如果中国在接下来几年每年增长6%至7%,新债务的利息成本不应比这个水平高出很多——只要分配达到合理的高效率。 For this to happen, the single most important reform would be market pricing of deposit rates. This will be dangerous for banks, as Jiang Jianqing, head of IC, China’s biggest bank, told the FT recently: “If you do badly, you will be wiped out.” 要让这成为现实,最重要的改革措施将是让市场决定储蓄利率。这对是危险的,正如中国最大工商(IC)董事长姜建清最近对英国《金融时报》所表示的那样:“你干得不好就要淘汰。” But finance keeps moving away from official channels – around one-fifth of credit was formed outside of banks in 2009; now that share has doubled, according to Bernstein. To protect the banks, Beijing must move slowly; but if it moves too slowly, good companies could be starved of reasonable funding – and it runs the risk that China’s financial river will end up clogged with the detritus of too many bad experiments outside the banks. 但金融活动正不断脱离官方渠道——伯恩斯坦称,2009年有五分之一的信贷来自外,而现在这一比例已经翻番。为保护,中国高层只能慢慢来;但如果它过于迟缓,优质公司可能得不到合理的融资,而且以外开展了太多不良试验,中国的金融之河最终可能塞满这些试验的沉渣。 /201311/266484

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